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Abstract 
We analyze the effects of property rights and the resulting loss aversion on contest outcomes. 
We study three situations: in ‘gain’ two players start with no prize and make sunk bids to win 
a prize, whereas in ‘loss’ both the players start with prizes and whoever loses the contest loses 
their prize. Finally, in ‘mixed’ only one player starts with a prize that stays with him if he wins, 
but is transferred to the rival otherwise. Since the differences among the treatments arise only 
from framing, the expected utility model and the standard loss aversion model predict no 
difference in bids across treatments. We introduce a loss aversion model in which the property 
rights are made salient, and as a result the reference point varies across treatments. This model 
predicts average bids in descending order in the loss, the mixed, and the gain treatment; and 
higher bids by the player with property rights in the mixed treatment. The results from a 
laboratory experiment broadly support these predictions. In the laboratory, no significant 
difference is found in bids in the loss (gain) treatment versus bids by property rights holder 
(non-holder) in the mixed treatment. A model incorporating both loss aversion and social 
preferences explains this result.  
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1. Introduction 
Conflicts are ubiquitous. Examples of conflict range from war, terrorism, crime, political 
clashes, to rent seeking, sports, computer security, and legal battles. The analysis of conflicts 
– both theoretically and in the field – has consequently attracted substantial attention from 
economists. In any conflict, the parties involved expend costly resources to earn a gain or to 
avoid a loss. Irrespective of the outcome, the resources spent cannot be recovered. This enables 
one to use the tools of contest theory (see, e.g., Konrad, 2009) to analyze conflict situations. 
Private property rights (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973) and related issues of loss aversion 
– weighing loss more than gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) – are arguably some of the 
most important elements that determine the intensity of conflict. Disputes over property rights 
have been the source of conflict since the start of the civilization. The Indian Epic Mahabharata 
(see Smith, 2009) written in about 900 BC, for example, centers on the specific issue of 
property rights and the resulting conflict among kingdoms. More recent examples include 
conflicts between the UK and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, between China, Philippines, 
Viet Nam and several other countries in the South China Sea and between Israel and Syria over 
Golan Heights. Such conflicts even exist in the animal kingdom. For example, when a parasitic 
wasp captures a host and tries to lay eggs; often another wasp tries to invade the host. 
Stockermans and Hardy (2013) and Humphries et al. (2006) use complementary approaches to 
show that those wasps who value the host most will fight harder and win more often. The 
phenomenon of loss aversion is also observed in international conflicts where the observed 
long status quos are often attributed to loss aversion (Levy, 1996). Zamir and Ritov (2012) 
argue in the law literature that it is efficient for the burden of proof in civil litigation to be on 
the plaintiff due to the presence of loss aversion. Loss aversion can be observed in sports 
contests as well. Lee (2004), for example, finds that the professional players in the World Poker 
Tour are more sensitive to losses than gains. Finally, Petersen & Hardy (1996) show that in the 
owner-intruder contests among wasps, the owner is advantaged, whereas Stokkebo and Hardy 
(2000) show that this is because egg load affects resource value perception (i.e., loss aversion). 
Existing research has focused on how property rights and conflict affect growth (e.g., 
Skaperdas, 1992; Hafer, 2006). However, some important aspects have received little attention 
in the literature. First, the effects of property rights on conflict intensity has hitherto not been 
theorized. Second, a behavioral foundation for the effect of property rights is lacking. Third, 
since it is difficult to obtain data from the field, there is little empirical evidence. 
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In this study we analyze the effects of property rights on conflict intensity. We model 
conflicts as contests and theorize that property rights invoke loss aversion. We derive testable 
predictions using both an expected utility model and a model with loss aversion (plus a further 
one with loss aversion and social preferences). Then we implement a laboratory experiment 
and test the hypotheses obtained from the theoretical models. In one treatment of the 
experiment, the two-player contest game is framed in a gain domain, in another it is framed in 
a loss domain, and in the final treatment it is framed in the gain domain for one player and in 
the loss domain for the other player. Our novel model with loss aversion provides a clear 
ranking of equilibrium bids (or efforts) by subjects whereas standard theories predict equal 
equilibrium bids in the different treatments. Experimental results support the prediction of loss 
aversion, whereby bids in a loss frame are significantly higher than bids in a gain frame. 
Whereas other rankings are preserved qualitatively, they are not statistically significant. A 
behavioral model rationalizes these findings. 
While the independent literatures on property rights, loss aversion and contests are 
huge, their intersection is thin.1 Loss aversion is a human tendency to strongly prefer avoiding 
losses to acquiring gains. Hence ownership of a valuable object understandably brings an 
aversion to losing that object. Property rights, thus, have a specific behavioral effect on the 
rights holder. The holder of the property rights might experience loss aversion (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991), whereas the non-holder might not. A series of studies following Kahneman 
et al. (1991) explore the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and 
attribute the difference to loss aversion or an endowment affect. Hoffman et al. (1996) show 
that dictators’ behavior is close to Nash equilibrium if they earn the endowment to be shared. 
This is also attributed to loss aversion or endowment effects. The application of the same 
notions in conflict or contests, however, is more recent.  
Contest theory analyzes situations in which players make costly bids in order to affect 
the probability of winning a prize. Given the real life implications of property rights and loss 
aversion in conflicts – often modeled as a contest –contest researchers were interested in this 
topic. Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2012) are the first to investigate this issue. They show 
theoretically that, with loss aversion, bids in a contest are lower. Kolmar (2008) uses a rent 
seeking contest with an endogenously produced rent to investigate endogenously enforced 
property rights as incentives for efficient production. Gill and Stone (2010) include loss 
                                                          
1 Various dimensions and the effects of property rights are investigated in the law and economics, and in the 
innovation literatures. Since our aim is very different from the aims of such literature, we do not cover them here. 
Interested readers may consult Barzel (1997) or Colombatto (2004) for references. 
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aversion in a tournament model with endogenous reference points and find identical players 
end up closer to their reference points. Morgan and Sisak (2015) show that the fear of losing 
may elicit higher bids in “winner takes all” investment games.  
The first experiment in this area is by Kong (2008) who implements a lottery contest 
experiment and elicits loss aversion with a survey. Supporting the result from Cornes and 
Hartley (2003), Kong (2008) shows that bids are decreasing in the degree of loss aversion. This 
is reiterated in Falk et al. (2008) who show that a larger prize spread might reduce bids in a 
tournament due to loss aversion. These, along with a further string of studies (Gill and Prowse, 
2012; Ernst and Thöni, 2013; Shupp et al., 2013; Price and Sheremeta, 2015; Sheremeta, 2016) 
find the general result that loss aversion leads to a lower level of bids in contests. Eisenkopf 
and Teyssier (2013) use a tournament model and, instead of a winner-take-all probability, they 
implement a prize-sharing rule as a function of the bids made. They show that this frame 
eliminates loss aversion. Dutcher et al. (2015) use the same explanatory variable as in Kong 
(2008) and find contradictory results. 
In contrast, we show theoretically and experimentally that property rights and the 
resulting loss aversion can result in higher bids in contests. Thus, in this study we make a three-
fold contribution. First, and most importantly, we are the first to show how loss aversion can 
result in more aggressive bidding in contests. Second, the current study along with Kimbrough 
and Sheremeta (2014), and Price and Sheremeta (2015) are the earliest studies that connect the 
issue of property rights to behavior in contests. Finally, we are the first to document framing 
effects in contest experiments, and provide a behavioral explanation of the results.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the treatments 
and derive theoretical predictions and related hypotheses. Section 3 describes the details of the 
experimental procedure. We report the results in Section 4. Section 5 describes a behavioral 
model that further better explains some experimental results, and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Treatments, theory and hypotheses 
In this section we first describe the different situations related to property rights and conflict 
and match them with the three treatments of this study. Next, we provide a theoretical 
background and the predictions generated by the expected utility theory, standard theory with 
loss aversion, and a theory with loss aversion in which salient property rights affect the 
reference point. We then present hypotheses arising from these theoretical predictions. 
In standard contest experiments, subjects start with no prize and make costly and 
irreversible bids to affect the likelihood of winning a prize. This essentially portrays situations 
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in which none of the players hold property rights and they engage in conflict to gain the 
property rights to the prize. Various contests such as sports, rent-seeking or innovation 
tournaments can be modeled in this way. We keep this gain frame as the baseline and introduce 
two further treatments. We first consider the polar opposite case in which both the players hold 
property rights to a prize, but may lose these due to the outcome of the conflict. Hence, in the 
loss frame we allow both the subjects to start with prizes and place bids. The winner gets to 
keep the prize but whoever loses the contest loses his prize. A number of contests such as the 
case of downsizing due to performance, elimination tournaments, or the fight between two 
gladiators in the amphitheater (the loser loses his right to life) exemplify this frame. In the final 
treatment we consider the case where one of the players holds property rights that he may lose, 
whereas the other player does not hold property rights, but may gain it as an outcome of the 
conflict. In this mixed frame, one of the subjects starts with a prize whereas the other starts with 
no prize. The prize stays with the subject-with-prize if he wins, and is transferred to the subject-
without-prize otherwise. Examples given in the introduction, including that of the wasp and 
conflicts between countries, or a boxing title match (in which the current champion holds the 
title, but may lose it to the challenger) are eminent field examples of this frame. 
In the laboratory we implement the above three treatments in a two-player Tullock 
(1980) contest. Each player has initial resource 𝐸 that can be spent in the contest. Let player 𝑖 
bid 𝑏𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝐸]. Irrespective of the outcome of the contest, players forgo their bids. The 
probability that player 𝑖 wins is represented by a Tullock (1980) contest success function: 
𝑝𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2) = {
𝑏𝑖/ (𝑏1 + 𝑏2)    if (𝑏1 + 𝑏2) ≠ 0   
1/2         otherwise 
 and ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝑏1, 𝑏2) = 1   (1) 
Given the contest success function, we now formally introduce the treatments below.  
Gain Treatment. None of the players holds initial property rights to a prize and hence both 
start with no prize. They compete to win a prize of common value 𝑉 > 0 that is gained by the 
winner, but there is no prize for the loser. The payoff function of player 𝑖 is: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2) = {
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖)    with prob 𝑝𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2)          
 0 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖)    with prob 1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2)   
     (2) 
Loss Treatment. Both players hold initial property rights to the prize, and consequently each 
player starts with a prize of common value 𝑉 > 0. Post contest, the winner gets to keep his 
prize but the loser must relinquish theirs. The payoff function of player 𝑖 is: 
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𝜋𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏−𝑖) = {
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖) − 0   with prob 𝑝𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2)         
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖) − 𝑉   with prob 1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2) 
    (3) 
Mixed Treatment. Without loss of generality assume that player 1 holds the initial property 
rights for a prize but player 2 does not. Hence, player 1 starts with the prize of common value 
𝑉 > 0 and player 2 does not start with any prize. After the contest, if player 1 is the winner 
then he gets to keep his prize. But if player 2 is the winner then the prize is transferred to them. 
Hence, the payoff functions of the players are: 
𝜋1(𝑏1, 𝑏2) = {
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏1) − 0   with prob 𝑝1(𝑏1, 𝑏2)         
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏1) − 𝑉   with prob 1 − 𝑝1(𝑏1, 𝑏2) 
             (4A) 
𝜋2(𝑏1, 𝑏2) = {
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏2)   with prob 1 − 𝑝1(𝑏1, 𝑏2)
0 + (𝐸 − 𝑏2)   with prob 𝑝1(𝑏1, 𝑏2)        
              (4B) 
Note that once we set 𝑉 − 𝑉 = 0, the payoff functions in (2), (3), (4A) and (4B) are the 
same. Hence, under risk neutrality and assuming no loss aversion, the expected payoff of player 
𝑖, 𝐸(𝜋𝑖) for 𝑖 = 1,2, in each of the cases becomes: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖)         (5) 
The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for this game are proved by 
Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997). Following standard procedures (e.g., Chowdhury and 
Sheremeta, 2011), the unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium bid is 𝑏∗ = 𝑉/4  and the 
equilibrium payoff is 𝜋∗ = 𝐸 + 𝑉/4.2 Note that the equilibrium bid, when one does not 
consider loss aversion, does not depend on the initial endowment or on the specific treatment.  
Cornes and Hartley (2012) introduce the standard version of a loss aversion model in a 
Tullock contest in which the players “value gains less than losses of similar magnitude”. There 
may exist multiple equilibria, but for the specific two-player symmetric lottery case we are 
concerned with, Cornes and Hartley (2012) show that the equilibrium is unique. Again, since 
the payoff functions are the same in (2), (3), (4A) and (4B), the equilibrium bids are also the 
same for the three treatments. However, the authors find that the equilibrium bid is lower in 
magnitude than the equilibrium bid under no loss aversion (i.e., 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠−𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗
< 𝑉/4).3  
Let us denote the bids in the Gain frame as 𝑏𝐺, bids in the Loss frame as 𝑏𝐿, bids by the 
holder of the property rights in the Mixed frame as 𝑏𝑀𝐿, and the bids by the player with no 
                                                          
2 A requirement for this equilibrium is 𝐸 ≥ 𝑉/4, which we ensure in our experimental design. 
3 For this two-player case, see Sheremeta (2013) for an easier version of the proof. 
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property rights in the Mixed frame as 𝑏𝑀𝐺 . Since we are interested in treatment effects and not 
bid levels, we can combine the predictions from the standard expected utility and Cornes and 
Hartley (2012) type loss aversion models. Then the predictions are: 
𝑏𝐺 = 𝑏𝐿 = 𝑏𝑀𝐿 = 𝑏𝑀𝐺           (6) 
As an alternative, we propose a variation of the loss aversion model focusing on the 
salience of the property rights. Our experimental design relies solely on such salience through 
framing; which, in turn, induces loss aversion over the property rights to the prize. Hence, we 
implement a standard model of loss aversion where the utility of player 𝑖 (𝑢𝑖) is piece-wise 
linear about a reference point, 𝑅, and the players maximize their expected utility. 
𝑢𝑖 = {
𝜋𝑖                             if 𝜋𝑖 ≥ 𝑅
𝑅 + 𝜆[𝜋𝑖 − 𝑅]      if 𝜋𝑖 < 𝑅
                    (7) 
where 𝜆 > 1 is the loss aversion parameter.  
The reference point 𝑅 is the earnings ‘before’ the resolution of uncertainty. Hence, the 
natural reference point given the way the payoffs are structured, and are presented in the 
experiment would be: 
𝑅 = {
[𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖)]      for the property right holder                       
(𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖)                 for the property right non − holder          
    (8) 
Once we incorporate Eq. 8 in Eq. 7 and consider the Gain (no initial property rights) 
treatment, after some manipulation the utility function becomes the same as the payoff function 
in Eq. 2: 
𝑢𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2) = {
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖)    with prob 𝑝𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2)          
 0 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖)    with prob 1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2)   
     (9) 
As a result, the expected utility becomes the same as the expected payoff (Eq. 5) in the 
‘no loss aversion’ case. Hence, the equilibrium bid also remains the same: 𝑏𝐺 = 𝑉/4. 
However, when we consider the Loss (initial property rights) treatment and run the 
necessary manipulations, the utility function (corresponding to Eq. 3) becomes: 
𝑢𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏−𝑖) = {
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖)             with prob 𝑝𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2)         
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖) − 𝜆𝑉   with prob 1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑏1, 𝑏2) 
              (10) 
And the corresponding expected utility becomes: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖𝜆𝑉 + ((1 − 𝜆)𝑉 + 𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖)                 (11) 
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Applying standard procedures, the unique Nash equilibrium bid is: 𝑏𝐿 = 𝜆𝑉/4.  
Note that these reduced form utility functions can be interpreted simply as considering 
the ‘gain value’ at 𝑉 while considering the ‘loss value’ at 𝜆𝑉 > 𝑉. The case for the Mixed 
treatment then similarly follows. Here the expected utility for the property rights holder is 
depicted by Eq. 11, while the expected utility for the player with no property rights is depicted 
by Eq. 2. Solving for equilibrium provides the following equilibrium bids: 𝑏𝑀𝐺 = 𝜆𝑉/(1 + 𝜆)
2 
and 𝑏𝑀𝐿 = 𝜆
2𝑉/(1 + 𝜆)2.  
Note that the average equilibrium bid in the Mixed treatment is 𝑏𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ = [𝑏𝑀𝐺 + 𝑏𝑀𝐿]/2 =
[𝜆𝑉/(1 + 𝜆)2 + 𝜆2𝑉/(1 + 𝜆)2]/2 = 𝜆𝑉/2(1 + 𝜆). Given 𝜆 > 1, it is thus easy to observe that 
𝜆𝑉/4 > 𝜆𝑉/2(1 + 𝜆) > 𝑉/4. This gives us the first hypothesis that there is a clear ranking 
among average bids across different treatments. In specific, the average bid in the Mixed 
treatment lies in between the average (or individual) bids in the Loss and the Gain treatments. 
Hypothesis 1:  𝑏𝐿 > 𝑏𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ > 𝑏𝐺 . 
It is also easy to observe that, given 𝜆 > 1, the bids by players with property rights are 
higher than the bids by the players without property rights in the Mixed treatment. This gives 
the next Hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2:  𝑏𝑀𝐿 > 𝑏𝑀𝐺 . 
Lastly, it can be observed after some manipulation that there is a ranking among the 
bids of the four different types of players: 𝜆𝑉/4 > 𝜆2𝑉/(1 + 𝜆)2 > 𝑉/4 > 𝜆𝑉/(1 + 𝜆)2. This 
provides our next hypothesis that players with (without) property rights in the Loss (Gain) 
treatment bid more than their counterpart in the Mixed treatment: 
Hypothesis 3: 𝑏𝐿 > 𝑏𝑀𝐿 and 𝑏𝐺 > 𝑏𝑀𝐺. 
Recall that the Cornes and Hartley (2012) model (with standard loss aversion but no 
property rights) predicts lower bids with loss-aversion than without loss-aversion. However, 
this model suggests no difference across treatments because the reference point in this model 
is the initial endowment that remains constant across treatments. Contrary to this, our model 
finds a positive effect of loss aversion on bids because the reference point changes in our model 
depending on whether a player holds the property rights or not.   
A diagrammatic description of the hypotheses is given in Figure 1 where the 𝑋-axis (𝑌-
axis) depicts the bids of Player 1 (Player 2). Consider 4 cases: Player 1 holds or does not hold 
property rights vs. Player 2 holds or does not hold property rights. The parabolas are best 
9 
 
response functions of the players: e.g., the large dotted parabola 𝑏1𝐿(𝑏2) is the best response 
of Player 1 when he holds property rights. An equilibrium is achieved at the intersection of the 
best response functions of the two players. Observe that the bid by Player 1 when both he and 
the rival hold property rights, 𝑏𝐿, is greater than the bid 𝑏𝑀𝐿, when he holds property rights but 
his rival does not. This, in turn is greater than the bid 𝑏𝐺, when none hold property rights. The 
bid 𝑏𝑀𝐺 , when Player 1 does not hold property rights but his rival does, is the smallest. 
Figure 1. Equilibrium bid with property rights and loss aversion 
 
The intuition behind this ranking is simple. As shown in the reduced form utility 
functions, in the Loss frame both the players perceive loss with higher weight. However, in 
Mixed, only the property rights holder does so. Due to the asymmetry, the response of the 
property rights holder to other player’s bid is not as high as the case when both face loss 
aversion. Similarly, the ranking in Hypothesis 3 appears due to asymmetry in player type in 
the Mixed treatment. Put another way, when a player with no property rights faces one with 
property rights, he reduces his bid. 
3. Experimental procedures 
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and was run in a 
laboratory of the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science at the University of 
East Anglia. The subjects were students at the University and were recruited through the online 
recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We employed a fixed matching protocol meaning 
that in each session two subjects were randomly matched into one group of contestants and the 
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matching did not change in a session. We implemented a fixed matching since each pair of 
subjects under this protocol constitutes one independent observation, but a random matching 
protocol gives only one independent observation per session. Forty-four subjects participated 
in each of the Loss and the Gain treatments (22 independent observations each) and 88 subjects 
in the Mixed treatment (44 independent observations). This is because in the last treatment we 
have 44 subjects who hold property rights and the remaining 44 subjects do not. 
In all the treatments, two players compete for a prize of 180 tokens, i.e., 𝑉 = 180. Hence, 
the expected utility equilibrium bid (𝑏∗) per period is 45 tokens in all treatments. This remains 
the same in finite repetitions of the one-shot game, but repetition allows us to control for 
learning. Each player receives a budget of 180 tokens in each period, and can enter bids up to 
one decimal place. While players compete in each of 25 periods, they are paid the average 
earning of five randomly chosen periods. All subjects in a session are paid for the same five 
rounds. We implement such payment scheme since paying for all the periods may trigger 
accumulated wealth effect over the periods; whereas if we pay only one period, then the payoff 
dispersion among subjects is likely to be large. Table 1 summarizes the treatment details. 
Table 1. Treatment specification 
 
We implemented instructions for the Gain and Loss treatments that closely correspond 
to Eq. 2 and Eq. 3. For example, in the Gain treatment it is spelled out that if they receive the 
reward then the earning is = Endowment + Reward – bid. However, if they do not receive the 
reward then the earning is = Endowment – bid. For the Loss treatment, the subjects were told 
that each of them starts with a reward, but they might lose it. If they keep the reward then the 
earning is = (Endowment + Reward) – bid – 0; but if they lose the reward then the earning is = 
(Endowment + Reward) – bid – Reward. Similarly, for the Mixed treatment the instructions 
closely followed Eq. 4A and 4B. Subjects were told that one of the subjects in each subject pair 
starts with a reward whereas the other does not. If the reward holder wins the contest, then he 
gets to keep his reward, but if the non-holder wins the contest, then the reward is transferred to 
Treatment 
Budget / 
period (𝑬) 
Players / 
group (𝑵) 
Prize value 
(𝑽) 
Expected Utility 
Eqbm bid (𝒃∗) 
Total no. 
of 
subjects 
Gain  180 2 180 45 44 
Loss  180 2 180 45 44 
Mixed  180 2 180 45 88 
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the non-holder. Further, the same player started with the reward in each period. Please see 
Appendix II for the instructions used in the experiment.    
Each subject participated in only one of the sessions and no subject had previously 
participated in any contest or loss aversion experiment. Before the contest part, a risk elicitation 
task a la Eckel and Grossman (2008) was run, but the outcome of this task was not revealed 
until the end of the experiment. Instructions were read aloud by an experimenter, after which 
subjects answered a quiz before they could proceed to the experiment. Before the payment was 
made, subject demographic information were collected through an anonymous survey. Each 
session took around 45 minutes. At the end of each session the token earnings were converted 
to GBP at the rate of 1 token to 3 Pence. Subjects on average earned about £8.40.  
4. Results 
We first report the results aggregated at the treatment level, and test Hypothesis 1. We then 
move on to analyze bids at the individual level and test Hypotheses 2 and 3. In each case, we 
report descriptive statistics before running non-parametric tests or panel regressions.  
4.1 Aggregate results 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of bids in the three treatments. We run z-tests (Wilcoxon 
ranksum tests) that confirm the common phenomenon in Tullock experiments (see Dechenaux 
et al., 2015) that average bids in each treatment are higher than the equilibrium bid of 45 (p-
values < 0.05 in each test). Moreover, a Kruskal Wallis test also confirms that the distributions 
of bids are different across treatments (chi-squared = 8.379 with 2 d.f.; p = 0.015), rejecting 
the prediction from the expected utility model (Eq. 6).   
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of bids across subject-pairs per treatment 
  Obs Mean St Dev 
Gain  22 53.747 19.426 
Loss  22 71.901 17.858 
Mixed 44 62.662 22.112 
 
Observe that there is a clear ranking of average bids across treatments. The mean bid 
in Gain treatment is 53.7; this increases to 62.7 in the Mixed treatment and to 71.9 in the Loss 
treatment. To understand if this is a common phenomenon over the time-periods, we plot the 
trends in average individual bids over the 25 periods in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Average individual bids over time 
 
Figure 2 shows that this ranking remains stable over the 25 periods (the horizontal line 
is the equilibrium bid at 45). Hence, the data, at least qualitatively, support Hypothesis 1. To 
test this formally we run pairwise Wilcoxon tests (reported in Table 3).  
Table 3. Pairwise comparison of treatments: Two-sided Wilcoxon tests 
  Loss Frame Mixed Frame 
Gain Frame -2.887** -1.551 
 [0.040] [0.121] 
Loss Frame - 1.768* 
    [0.077] 
Note: Figures in brackets are p-values; ** and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels. 
The tests confirm significant differences between Loss and Gain, and between Loss and 
Mixed; but the difference between the Gain and Mixed is marginally insignificant at the 
conventional level (p-value = 0.12). This gives our first result.   
 Result 1: Average bids in the Loss treatment are significantly higher than average bids 
in the Gain and the Mixed treatment. However, differences in average bids between the Gain 
and the Mixed treatment are not significant at the conventional level.  
 This result broadly supports Hypothesis 1, and confirms the effects of loss aversion 
through property rights. Note that our model with loss aversion does not include the social 
preferences of the subjects. However, social preferences – especially spite – might explain the 
no-difference result between Gain and Mixed. In Section 5 we develop a behavioral model with 
social preferences that explains this finding.  
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4.2 Individual level results: with and without property rights 
We next investigate if there are differences in behavior between the holders and non-holders 
of property rights within the Mixed treatment. Moreover, we investigate whether property 
rights holders (or non-holders) behave in the same way in a ‘pure’ treatment and in the Mixed 
treatment. Similar to Figure 1, Figure 2 presents the time trend of mean individual bids. The 
left (right) panel of Figure 2 presents bids of those with (without) property rights in the Mixed 
treatment and those in the Loss (Gain) treatment. Similarly, Table 4 now splits the descriptive 
statistics of the Mixed treatments into the holder and non-holder of property rights.  
Figure 3. Average bid over time  
   (a) Holders of property rights              (b) Non-holders of property rights 
  
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of bids  
  Obs. Mean St Dev 
Loss  22 71.901 17.858 
Mixed (holder) 44 65.914 26.340 
Mixed (non-holder) 44 59.409 23.680 
Gain  22 53.747 19.426 
 
Both Figure 3 and Table 4 illustrate that there is a ranking of bids as follows: Loss > 
Mixed (property rights holder) > Mixed (property rights non-holder) > Gain. This is indicative 
of support for Hypothesis 2, that the property rights holders bid more than the non-holders 
within the Mixed treatment. Furthermore, it suggests partial support for Hypotheses 3: bids in 
the Loss treatment are greater than bids of property rights holders in the Mixed treatment. But 
bids in the Gain treatment are not greater than the bids of property rights non-holders in the 
Mixed treatment.  
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However, a two-sided Wilcoxon test shows no difference in bids between those who 
have property rights in Mixed versus those in Loss: z = 1.360; p = 0.174.  This constitutes a 
rejection of Hypothesis 3. Similarly, a two-sided Wilcoxon tests shows no significant 
difference between who don’t have property rights in Mixed vs. those in Gain: z = -0.680 ; p = 
0.496. This is characterized by Result 2.  
Result 2: There is no significant difference between the bids of the holders of property rights 
in the Loss and in the Mixed treatment, as well as between the bids of the non-holders of 
property rights in the Gain and in the Mixed treatment.  
Finally, to distinguish between the bids of the holders and non-holders of property 
rights within the Mixed treatments (note that these observations are not independent) we 
implement a 𝑡-test that confirms treatment difference in bids (𝑡 = 1.836, p = 0.074) supporting 
Hypothesis 2.  
Note, however, the tests employed so far have been very conservative, given that those 
cannot incorporate the individual-specific or demographic effects, nor can those account for 
temporal effects. Most importantly, those cannot incorporate the cardinal information in the 
data. To incorporate all of these features, and to test robustness of the results above, we run a 
series of random effects panel regressions as reported in Table 5.  
The dependent variable is the bid by an individual subject in a period. We cluster 
standard errors at the subject-pair level and at the session level and run the regressions (a) for 
the whole data, (b) for only Gain treatment and Loss treatment data, and (c) separately for the 
Mixed treatment data. We are interested in the treatment effect and hence include two treatment 
dummies (keeping Gain as baseline) for the whole data and a dummy for the loss treatment in 
the Gain + Loss data. Furthermore, for the Mixed treatment we include a dummy for the holder 
of the property rights. A set of controls are also included. The demographic controls consist of 
a ‘risky behavior’ dummy (choosing more risky options 4-6 over less risky options 1-3 in the 
risk test), age, gender (female = 1), and experience in participating in economics experiments. 
The strategic controls are the lag of a player’s own bid, lag of the rival’s bid, a dummy for 
whether the player won in the last period, and a time trend. Our variables of interest are the 
treatment dummies and dummy for holder of property rights in the Mixed treatment. 
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Table 5. Random effects regression results  
Dep. var: Bid All All Gain-Loss Gain-Loss Mixed Mixed 
Lag bid 0.485*** 0.474*** 0.453*** 0.444*** 0.504*** 0.480*** 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.048) (0.044) 
       
Lag win -4.624*** -4.461*** -3.247*** -3.150*** -6.215*** -5.814*** 
 (1.044) (1.045) (1.192) (1.189) (1.702) (1.702) 
       
Lag other bid 0.174*** 0.170*** 0.215*** 0.211*** 0.147*** 0.143*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) (0.031) 
       
Loss treatment 6.457*** 7.079*** 6.275*** 6.526***   
dummy (2.095) (2.075) (2.195) (2.184)   
       
Mixed treatment 3.042 4.068**     
dummy (1.919) (1.855)     
       
Property      4.657* 6.689** 
rights holder     (2.409) (2.625) 
       
Period -0.009 -0.013 0.010 0.008 -0.031 -0.040 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.124) (0.127) (0.084) (0.088) 
       
Risk dummy  -5.363***  -3.299*  -6.868*** 
  (1.535)  (1.854)  (2.413) 
       
Age ≥21  -2.796*  -0.415  -5.448** 
  (1.532)  (1.917)  (2.467) 
       
Female  -0.721  0.976  -2.750 
  (1.571)  (2.056)  (2.586) 
       
Experience in  0.178  0.196*  -0.156 
Experiment  (0.109)  (0.110)  (0.474) 
       
Constant 20.80*** 24.61*** 19.39*** 20.10*** 23.05*** 31.79*** 
 (2.676) (2.963) (3.225) (3.696) (4.371) (4.879) 
Observations 4224 4224 2112 2112 2112 2112 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are SEs clustered at subject-pair and session level; *, **, and ** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
The regressions provide several interesting results. First, these reiterate Result 1 and 
Result 2. Both in the combined regression as well as in the regression comparing only the Loss 
and the Gain treatments, the coefficient for the Loss treatment dummy is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, unlike with the non-parametric tests, the dummy for 
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the Mixed treatment is also positive and significant. Hence, these provide stronger support for 
Hypothesis 1.4 Finally, the dummy for property rights holder in the Mixed treatment is positive 
and significant – indicating that the bids by the property rights holders are higher than the non-
holders within the Mixed treatment. These (along with the 𝑡-test result described earlier) 
provide formal support for loss aversion and for Hypothesis 2, and lead to Result 3:  
Result 3: The bids entered by the holders of property rights are greater than the bids entered 
by the non-holders of property rights within the Mixed treatment.  
5. A behavioral explanation for the lack of significant differences in ranking 
In the previous section we showed that both between the Loss and the Gain treatments 
as well as within the Mixed treatment a holder of property rights enters higher bids than a non-
holder. This is explained by a theoretical model with loss aversion. However, some other 
predictions regarding the ranking (e.g., 𝑏𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ > 𝑏𝐺  and 𝑏𝐺 > 𝑏𝑀𝐺) are not supported by the 
experimental data and we cannot reject 𝑏𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑏𝐺  and 𝑏𝐺 = 𝑏𝑀𝐺. Although the model with loss 
aversion fulfills the main objective of predicting treatment effects, it does not include social 
preferences of the subjects. Here we argue that social preferences such as inequality aversion 
may explain the divergence between these hypotheses and empirical findings; i.e., a model 
with social preference may explain why we do not find such clear ranking of bids in our data.  
We introduce a linear model of inequality aversion of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as 
applied by Herrman and Orzen (2008) to contests. The model postulates that a subject might 
dislike disadvantageous inequity in payoffs, i.e., dislikes being behind others. Further, he might 
dislike it when the rival is disadvantaged; or might prefer such inequality if he is spiteful.  Then 
the utility function with social preferences for player 𝑖 is: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝛼 max(𝑢𝑗 − 𝑢𝑖 , 0) − 𝛽 max(𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑗 , 0)               (12) 
where 𝑢𝑖  and 𝑢𝑗 are the players’ utility without social preference (but with loss aversion), and 
𝛼 ≥ 0 and 𝛽 ≤ 1 are the disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion parameters 
(with more weight to disadvantageous inequity, i.e., 𝛼 ≥ 𝛽, and a negative 𝛽 captures spite).  
The utility function without social preference but with loss aversion for a player with 
no property rights is given by Eq. 9, whereas the utility with property rights is given by Eq. 10. 
Including those in Eq. 12 and solving, it is easy to show that the equilibrium bid in the Loss 
frame is higher than the same in the Gain frame. This is summarized in the proposition below. 
                                                          
4 The coefficients for the controls have the usual signs and significance levels (see, e.g., Dechenaux et al., 2015).  
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Proposition 1. Equilibrium bid with social preference in the Gain frame is 𝑏𝐺
∗ =
𝑉(1+𝛼−𝛽)
2(2+𝛼−𝛽)
 and 
in the Loss frame is 𝑏𝐿
∗ =
𝜆𝑉(1+𝛼−𝛽)
2(2+𝛼−𝛽)
. 
Proof: See Appendix I-A. 
Interestingly, Proposition 1 shows that since 𝜆 > 1, 𝑏𝐿
∗ > 𝑏𝐺
∗ : i.e., bids are higher in the 
Loss treatment than in the Gain treatment – even after accounting for the social preferences.  
It is, however, not easy to find a closed form solution for the Mixed frame, and no 
specific hypotheses relating to the Mixed treatment can be stated. This is since the ranking may 
change depending on the values attached to the inequity aversion parameters. The most we can 
obtain are the best response functions. These are presented in the next proposition. 
Proposition 2. If player 𝑖 is the holder of property rights and player 𝑗 is not, then the 
equilibrium bid with social preference in the Mixed frame is obtained by solving the best 
response functions:  
𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − (1 − 𝜆)𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 1 + 𝛼𝜆𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛼
𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛼
𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛽𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 −
𝛽
𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 + 𝛽
2𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗+𝑏𝑖
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 = 0  
𝑉
𝑏𝑖
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 1 + 𝛼𝑉
𝑏𝑖
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛼
𝑏𝑖
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛼
𝑏𝑖
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛽𝜆𝑉
𝑏𝑖
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛽
𝑏𝑖
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 +
𝛽
2𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗+𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 = 0.               
Proof: See Appendix I-B.  
We now show that depending on the values of the social preference parameters and the 
loss aversion parameter, it is possible that 𝑏𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ > 𝑏𝐺  or 𝑏𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ < 𝑏𝐺 . As a numerical example, 
consider 𝑉 = 180, 𝜆 = 2, 𝛼 = 0.5. Now, when 𝛽 = 0.3 then 𝑏𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ = 41.882 < 49.091 = 𝑏𝐺; but 
when 𝛽 = −0.3, then  𝑏𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ = 79.781 > 57.857 = 𝑏𝐺 . Similarly for some parameter ranges it 
may be that 𝑏𝐺 > 𝑏𝑀𝐺  but for some other parameter ranges 𝑏𝐺 < 𝑏𝑀𝐺 . 
To provide a visual representation of this fact and to show how these opposite results 
occur over parameter ranges, we run simulations of individual bids in the three treatments for 
𝑉 = 180, 𝜆 = 2, 𝛼 ∈ [0,1], 𝛽 ∈ [−0.5,0.5] and 𝛼 ≥ 𝛽. First, unsurprisingly, the simulations 
support Hypothesis 2: the equilibrium bid by the property rights holder in the Mixed treatment 
is higher than non-holder in the same treatment, i.e., 𝑏𝑀𝐿 > 𝑏𝑀𝐺. 
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Next, we test whether Hypothesis 1, which predicts higher average bids in the Mixed 
treatment compared than in the Gain treatment (𝑏𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ > 𝑏𝐺), holds. The result is shown in Figure 
4 and the details of the simulation procedures are reported in Appendix I-C. The equilibrium 
bid in the Mixed treatment is greater (lower) than the bid in the Gain treatment in the light 
(dark) grey area (white area shows 𝛼 < 𝛽). Hence, with a mix of subjects some of whom belong 
to the light grey area whereas some other belong to the dark grey area, then the overall empirical 
result may become unclear; explaining insignificant difference between the bid levels.  
Figure 4. Simulated bids in the Mixed treatment versus in the Gain treatment  
  
We further run simulations with the same parametric restrictions for the non-holders of 
property rights in the Mixed and Gain treatments. Observe from Figure 5 that the equilibrium 
bids by such players in the Mixed treatment are greater (lower) than the bid in the Gain 
treatment in the light (dark) grey area. In specific, for low 𝛼 values when there is spite (𝛽 < 0) 
the theoretical prediction from Hypothesis 3 (𝑏𝑀𝐺 < 𝑏𝐺) may be reversed. Hence, when the 
subject pool has both type of individuals, then we may not be able to reject that 𝑏𝑀𝐺 = 𝑏𝐺. 
Figure 5. Simulated bids by non-holders in the Mixed treatment vs. in the Gain treatment 
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6. Discussion 
We analyze the effects of property rights and the resulting loss aversion on behavior in contests. 
We implement a novel experimental design that changes the property rights only through 
framing. The standard theoretical models of expected utility (Tullock, 1980) or loss aversion 
(Cornes and Hartely, 2012) predict no difference in bids between treatments, whereas a loss 
aversion model with salient property rights – that we introduce – provides a clear ranking of 
equilibrium bids across treatments. Furthermore, whereas existing contest experiments 
involving loss aversion show a lower bid as a result of loss aversion, we predict the opposite. 
In our experiment, bids in the Loss frame are significantly higher than bids in the Gain frame 
both in the ‘pure’ as well as in the Mixed treatments – confirming our theoretical predictions. 
Some further rankings of bids are not statistically significant, and a behavioral model that 
accounts for differences in social preferences can explain this lack of significant differences.  
These results have several interesting implications. First, the existing literature cannot 
explain the real-life phenomenon that a property rights holder expends higher effort than a non-
holder (e.g. the Kauravas expended more resources than the Pandavas in the Indian epic 
Mahabharata, or a host wasp spends more effort than an invader wasp, or Israel – ceteris paribus 
– spends more on military in Golan Heights than Syria). We, in contrast, show that the effect 
of property rights and loss aversion is very robust: property rights and the resulting loss 
aversion result in higher bids. Both our theoretical and empirical results, hence, provide a 
micro-founded explanation of such field observations from biology, litigation, and conflict 
literatures. Second, this is the first experiment, to our knowledge, that employs framing in 
understanding behavior in a contest setting. There is a recent strand of literature that 
investigates the effects of experimental design (see Chowdhury et al. (2014) for an example 
and literature) on contest outcomes. The current study contributes also to this area. Third, and 
relating to the second point above, these results provide new insights for both contest design 
and policy. For example, since it is possible to manipulate bids in contests by simply changing 
the frame, it may be useful to introduce such framing effects as ‘nudges’ in organizations and 
tournaments. Finally, we believe that the current results will provide guidance for future 
research in the areas of both contest theory and behavioral conflict literature.  
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Appendix I: Proofs of the Propositions and Simulation Details 
 
A. Proof of Proposition 1 
From Eq. 12, the utility function with social preference for player 𝑖 is: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝛼 max(𝑢𝑗 − 𝑢𝑖 , 0) − 𝛽 max(𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑗 , 0) 
For the Gain treatment, we impose Eq. 9 and after some manipulation the utility under social 
preference becomes – 
𝑈𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) =
𝑏𝑖
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖) − 𝛼
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
[𝑉 + 𝑏𝑖 − 𝑏𝑗] − 𝛽
𝑏𝑖
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
[𝑉 + 𝑏𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖]  
Calculations for obtaining the equilibrium bid for the Gain treatment can be obtained directly 
from Herrmann and Orzen (2008, pp. 37-39). This leads to: 
𝑏𝐺
∗ =
𝑉(1 + 𝛼 − 𝛽)
2(2 + 𝛼 − 𝛽)
 
For the Loss treatment, we impose Eq. 10 and after some manipulation the utility under social 
preference becomes – 
𝑈𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) =
𝑏𝑖
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
𝑉 +
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
(1 − 𝜆)𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖) − 𝛼
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
[𝜆𝑉 + 𝑏𝑖 − 𝑏𝑗] −
𝛽
𝑏𝑖
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
[𝜆𝑉 + 𝑏𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖]  
𝜕𝑈𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
= 𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗)
2 − (1 − 𝜆)𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗)
2 − 1 + 𝛼𝜆𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛼
𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗)
2
− 𝛼
𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛽𝜆𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛽
𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗)
2 + 𝛽
2𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗 + 𝑏𝑖
2
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗)
2  
Symmetry implies 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑏𝑗 = 𝑏
∗ imposing this in 
𝜕𝑈𝑖(𝑏𝑖,𝑏𝑗)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
= 0 returns – 
 𝑉
1
4𝑏∗
− (1 − 𝜆)𝑉
1
4𝑏∗
− 1 + 𝛼𝜆𝑉
1
4𝑏∗
− 𝛼
1
4
− 𝛼
1
4
− 𝛽𝜆𝑉
1
4𝑏∗
− 𝛽
1
4
+ 𝛽
3
4
= 0 
𝑉
2𝑏∗
−
(1 − 𝜆)𝑉
2𝑏∗
+
𝛼𝜆𝑉
2𝑏∗
−
𝛽𝜆𝑉
2𝑏∗
= (2 + 𝛼 − 𝛽) 
𝑏𝐿
∗ =
𝜆𝑉(1+𝛼−𝛽)
2(2+𝛼−𝛽)
.         ■ 
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B. Proof of Proposition 2 
For the Mixed treatment, let player 𝑖 has property rights and player 𝑗 doesn’t, then following 
the same procedure as in Proposition 1 we obtain the utility under social preference for the 
non-holder of the property rights as – 
𝑈𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) =
𝑏𝑖
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
𝑉 +
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
(1 − 𝜆)𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑖) − 𝛼
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
[𝜆𝑉 + 𝑏𝑖 − 𝑏𝑗] −
𝛽
𝑏𝑖
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
[𝑉 + 𝑏𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖]  
FOC:  
𝜕𝑈𝑖(𝑏𝑖,𝑏𝑗)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
= 0 implies 
𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − (1 − 𝜆)𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 1 + 𝛼𝜆𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛼
𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛼
𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛽𝑉
𝑏𝑗
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 −
𝛽
𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 + 𝛽
2𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗+𝑏𝑖
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 = 0                                                
 
Similarly, the utility under social preference for the holder of the property rights is – 
𝑈𝑗(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) =
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
𝑉 + (𝐸 − 𝑏𝑗) − 𝛼
𝑏𝑖
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
[𝑉 + 𝑏𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖] − 𝛽
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗
[𝜆𝑉 + 𝑏𝑖 − 𝑏𝑗]   
  
FOC:  
𝜕𝑈𝑗(𝑏𝑖,𝑏𝑗)
𝜕𝑏𝑗
= 0 implies 
𝑉
𝑏𝑖
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 1 + 𝛼𝑉
𝑏𝑖
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛼
𝑏𝑖
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛼
𝑏𝑖
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛽𝜆𝑉
𝑏𝑖
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 − 𝛽
𝑏𝑖
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 +
𝛽
2𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗+𝑏𝑗
2
(𝑏𝑖+𝑏𝑗)
2 = 0                            ■ 
 
C. Details of the simulation 
The simulations are run using Matlab. The details of the procedures are described below.  
The FOCs are defined as FOC: R2 7! R2, more specifically 
𝐹𝑂𝐶(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) =
[
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑗(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏𝑗)
𝜕𝑏𝑗 ]
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Thus, strictly speaking, this function only returns the derivative of both utility functions 
at a certain combination of bid levels. 
We iterate on this function using a multivariate version of the Newton-Raphson 
algorithm with convergence criteria 𝜀 = 𝛿 = 10−6 and a maximum of 100 iterations.5 The 
initial vector of bids comes from two random draws from 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚[0,1]. 
Since the results seem to vary marginally with the draw of the initial vector, for each 
parameter constellation we drew 50 initial vectors, solved and only took the average of all those 
solutions into account if the sum of squares of these 50 draws was less than 0.01. 
This script was used in the following algorithm:6 
1. Set 𝛼 = −0.05, 𝛽 = −0.55, 𝜆 = 2, 𝑉 = 180. 
2. Increase 𝛼 by 0.05. 
3. Increase 𝛽 by 0.05. 
4. Compute equilibrium bids (for all 4 frames) and store together with 𝛼 and 𝛽. 
5. If 𝛽 < 0.5, then go to Step 3, otherwise set 𝛽 = −0.55 and go to the next step. 
6. If 𝛼 < 1, then go to Step 2, otherwise stop. 
The matrix that contains all saved data from step 4 is cleaned from all non-convergent 
cases and infinite solutions. It is the resulting matrix with which we created the graphs. 
The Matlab codes are available from the corresponding author by request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Where 𝜀 is the maximal distance between two iteration steps on bid levels we allow and 𝛿 is the maximum value 
the derivatives can have at a solution. See e.g. Miranda and Fackler (2004) for a detailed description. 
6 One can estimate 𝜆 from the Gain and the Loss treatments and the estimated value is 𝜆 = ~1.35. Although we 
have implemented 𝜆 = 2 for easier visual representation in our simulation, qualitative results from the simulation 
remains the same even when we make 𝜆 = 1.35. 
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Appendix II: Instructions 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS  
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. This experiment consists of two 
unrelated parts. Instructions for the first part are given next and the instructions for the second part will 
be provided after the first part of the experiment is finished. 
The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you 
can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have 
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to 
you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We 
expect and appreciate your cooperation. 
Experimental Currency is used in the experiment and your decisions and earnings will be 
recorded in tokens. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. Tokens 
earned from both parts of the experiment will be converted to Pound Sterling at a rate of: 
_1_ token to _3_ Pence (£0.03). 
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INSTRUCTIONS – PART 1 
In this task, you will be asked to choose from six different gambles (as shown below). Each 
circle represents a different gamble from which you must choose the one that you prefer. Each circle 
is divided in half, with the number of tokens that the gamble will give you in each circle. 
 
Your payment for this task will be determined at the end of today’s experiment. A volunteer 
will come to the front of the room and toss a coin. If the outcome is heads, you will receive the number 
of tokens in the light grey area of the circle you have chosen. Alternatively, if the outcome is tails, you 
will receive the number of tokens shown in the dark grey area of the circle you have chosen. Note that 
no matter which gamble you pick, each outcome has a 50% chance of occurring. 
Please select the gamble of your choice by clicking one of the “Check here” buttons that will 
appear on each circle in the picture Once you have made your choice, please click the “Confirm” button 
at the bottom of the screen. 
For your record, also tick the gamble you have chosen in the above picture. 
Once everyone has made their decision, this task will end and we will move on to Part 2 of the 
experiment. Your payment for this task will be decided at the end of today’s experiment. 
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INSTRUCTIONS – GAIN  
YOUR DECISION 
This part of the experiment consists of 25 decision-making periods. At the beginning, you will be 
randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 2 participants. The composition of your group will 
remain the same for all 25 periods. You will not know who your group member is at any time.  
 
Each period you will receive an initial endowment of 180 tokens. Each period, you may bid for a reward 
of 180 tokens. You may bid any number between 0 and 180 (including 0.1 decimal points). An example 
of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
For each bid there is an associated cost equal to the bid itself. The cost of your bid is: 
Cost of your bid = Your bid 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant in your 
group bid, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, your chance of receiving the reward 
is given by your bid divided by the sum of all 2 bids in your group: 
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Chance of receiving the reward =  
Your bid   
Sum of all 2 bids in your group   
                
You can consider the amounts of the bids to be equivalent to numbers of lottery tickets. The computer 
will draw one ticket from those entered by you and the other participant, and assign the reward to one 
of the participants through a random draw. If you receive the reward, your earnings for the period are 
equal to your endowment of 180 tokens plus the reward of 180 tokens minus the cost of your bid. If you 
do not receive the reward, your earnings for the period are equal to your endowment of 180 tokens 
minus the cost of your bid. In other words, your earnings are: 
                      
If you receive the reward: Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Cost of your bid = 180 + 180 – your bid 
  
         
  
If you do not receive the reward: Earnings = Endowment - Cost of your bid = 180 – your bid 
                      
 
An Example (for illustrative purposes only) 
Let’s say participant 1 bids 30 tokens and participant 2 bids 45 tokens. Therefore, the computer assigns 
30 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 45 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly 
draws one lottery ticket out of 75 (30 + 45). As you can see, participant 2 has the highest chance of 
receiving the reward: 0.60 = 45/75 and participant 1 has 0.40 = 30/75 chance of receiving the reward. 
Assume that the computer assigns the reward to participant 1, then the earnings of participant 1 for the 
period are 330 = 180 + 180 – 30, since the reward is 180 tokens and the cost of the bid is 30. Similarly, 
the earnings of participant 2 are 135 = 180 – 45.  
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all 2 bids in your group, your reward, and your earnings 
for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed 
you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet (page 4) under the 
appropriate heading. 
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IMPORTANT NOTES 
At the beginning of this part of the experiment you will be randomly grouped with another participant 
to form a 2-person group. You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to 
which group.  
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly choose 5 of the 25 periods for actual 
payment for this part of experiment. You will be paid the average of your earnings in these 5 periods. 
These earnings in tokens will be converted to cash at the exchange rate of _1_ token to _3_ Pence 
(£0.03) and will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions? 
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Personal Record Sheet 
(5 periods from here will be randomly chosen for final payments) 
Period Your bid 
Sum of all 2 
bids in your 
group 
Your reward 
Your earnings 
for this period 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
16         
17         
18         
19         
20         
21         
22         
23         
24         
25         
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Total Earnings 
Period Chosen Earnings for this period 
  
  
  
  
  
Total  
 
 
Total earnings from table above:       (1) 
  Average of above earnings: (1) ÷ 5       (2) 
Earnings from Part 1:       (3) 
Total earnings    (2) + (3)      (4) 
Multiply by exchange rate:                 (4)  ×  0.03       
 
Total payment for the experiment:  £     
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QUIZ 
1. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment?   
Ans.       Yes            No    
 
2. What is the value of 1 token in Pence?   
Ans.       3 Pence               6 Pence            9 Pence   
 
Questions 3 to 6 apply to the following information. 
 
In a given period, suppose the bids by participants in your group are as follows. 
Bid of participant 1: 55 tokens 
Bid of participant 2: 70 tokens 
 
 
3.  What is the chance that participant 1 will receive the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________  
 
4.  What is the chance that participant 2 will receive the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________  
 
 
5. If you are Participant 1 and you did not receive the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. ___________ tokens 
 
6. If you are Participant 2 and you received the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. ___________ tokens 
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EXPLANATIONS FOR QUIZ ANSWERS  
 
1. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment?  
Ans.       No 
2. What is the value of 1 token in Pence?   
Ans.       3 Pence   
3.  What is the chance that participant 1 will receive the reward?    
Ans.       55 out of 125. 
 
4.  What is the chance that participant 2 will receive the reward?    
Ans.       70 out of 125. 
 
5. If you are Participant 1 and you did not receive the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. 125 tokens   (= Endowment – bid = 180 – 55) 
 
6. If you are Participant 2 and you received the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. 290 tokens   (= Endowment + Reward – Bid = 180 + 180 – 70) 
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INSTRUCTIONS – LOSS  
YOUR DECISION 
This part of the experiment consists of 25 decision-making periods. At the beginning, you will be 
randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 2 participants. The composition of your group will 
remain the same for all 25 periods. You will not know who your group member is at any time.  
 
Each period both of you will receive an initial endowment of 180 tokens as well as a reward of 180 
tokens. Each period, both of you may bid to keep your reward, but only one of you will be able to keep 
your reward. You may bid any number between 0 and 180 (including 0.1 decimal points). An example 
of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
For each bid there is an associated cost equal to the bid itself. The cost of your bid is: 
Cost of your bid = Your bid 
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The more you bid, the more likely you are to keep the reward. The more the other participant in your 
group bids, the less likely you are to keep the reward. Specifically, your chance of keeping the reward 
is given by your bid divided by the sum of all 2 bids in your group: 
          
  
    
Chance of keeping the reward =  
Your bid   
Sum of all 2 bids in your group 
  
                
You can consider the amounts of the bids to be equivalent to numbers of lottery tickets. The computer 
will draw one ticket from those entered by you and the other participant, and decide which one of the 
participants will keep the reward through a random draw. If you get to keep your reward, your earnings 
for the period are equal to your endowment of 180 tokens plus the reward of 180 tokens minus the cost 
of your bid. If you do not get to keep your reward, your earnings for the period are equal to your 
endowment of 180 tokens minus the cost of your bid. In other words, your earnings are: 
  
                    
If you keep the reward: Earnings = (Endowment + Reward) – Cost of your bid – 0   
= 180 + 180 – your bid – 0  
           
  
If you do not keep the reward: Earnings = (Endowment + Reward) – Cost of your bid – Reward           
= 180 + 180 – your bid – 180 = 180 – your bid 
  
                    
 
An Example (for illustrative purposes only) 
Let’s say participant 1 bids 30 tokens and participant 2 bids 45 tokens. Therefore, the computer assigns 
30 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 45 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly 
draws one lottery ticket out of 75 (30 + 45). As you can see, participant 2 has the highest chance of 
keeping the reward: 0.60 = 45/75 and participant 1 has 0.40 = 30/75 chance of keeping the reward. 
Assume that the computer decides that participant 1 will keep the reward, then the earnings of 
participant 1 for the period are 330 = (180 + 180) – 30 – 0, since the reward is 180 tokens and the cost 
of the bid is 30. Similarly, the earnings of participant 2 are 135 = (180 + 180) – 45 – 180.  
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all 2 bids in your group, if you could keep your reward, 
and your earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome 
screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet (page 
4) under the appropriate heading. 
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IMPORTANT NOTES 
At the beginning of this part of the experiment you will be randomly grouped with another participant 
to form a 2-person group. You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to 
which group.  
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly choose 5 of the 25 periods for actual 
payment for this part of experiment. You will be paid the average of your earnings in these 5 periods. 
These earnings in tokens will be converted to cash at the exchange rate of _1_ token to _3_ Pence 
(£0.03) and will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions? 
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Personal Record Sheet 
(5 periods from here will be randomly chosen for final payments) 
Period Your bid 
Sum of all 2 
bids in your 
group 
Your reward 
Your earnings 
for this period 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
16         
17         
18         
19         
20         
21         
22         
23         
24         
25         
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Total Earnings 
Period Chosen Earnings for this period 
  
  
  
  
  
Total  
 
 
Total earnings from table above:       (1) 
  Average of above earnings: (1) ÷ 5       (2) 
Earnings from Part 1:       (3) 
Total earnings    (2) + (3)      (4) 
Multiply by exchange rate:                 (4)  ×  0.03       
 
Total payment for the experiment:  £     
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QUIZ 
1. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment?   
Ans.       Yes            No    
 
2. What is the value of 1 token in Pence?   
Ans.       3 Pence               6 Pence            9 Pence   
 
Questions 3 to 6 apply to the following information. 
 
In a given period, suppose the bids by participants in your group are as follows. 
Bid of participant 1: 55 tokens 
Bid of participant 2: 70 tokens 
 
 
3.  What is the chance that participant 1 will keep the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________  
 
4.  What is the chance that participant 2 will keep the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________  
 
 
5. If you are Participant 1 and you did not keep the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. ___________ tokens 
 
6. If you are Participant 2 and you kept the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. ___________ tokens 
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EXPLANATIONS FOR QUIZ ANSWERS  
 
1. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment?  
Ans.       No 
2. What is the value of 1 token in Pence?   
Ans.       3 Pence   
3.  What is the chance that participant 1 will keep the reward?    
Ans.       55 out of 125. 
 
4.  What is the chance that participant 2 will keep the reward?    
Ans.       70 out of 125. 
 
5. If you are Participant 1 and you did not keep the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. 125 tokens   (= Endowment – bid = 180 – 55) 
 
6. If you are Participant 2 and you kept the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. 290 tokens   (= Endowment + Reward – Bid = 180 + 180 – 70) 
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INSTRUCTIONS – MIXED 
YOUR DECISION 
This part of the experiment consists of 25 decision-making periods. At the beginning, you will be 
randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 2 participants. The composition of your group will 
remain the same for all 25 periods. You will not know who your group member is at any time.  
 
Each period you will receive an initial endowment of 180 tokens. One of you will also start each period 
with a reward of 180 tokens and the other will start with no reward. These roles will be the same 
throughout the experiment. Both of you may bid to either keep the reward (if you already have it), or to 
transfer the reward to you from the other participant (if you do not already have it). You may bid any 
number between 0 and 180 (including 0.1 decimal points). An example of your decision screen is shown 
below. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
For each bid there is an associated cost equal to the bid itself. The cost of your bid is: 
Cost of your bid = Your bid 
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If you start with the reward, then the more you bid, the more likely you are to keep the reward. The 
more the other participant in your group bids, the less likely you are to keep the reward. Specifically, 
your chance of keeping the reward is given by your bid divided by the sum of all 2 bids in your group: 
                
Chance of keeping the reward (if you start 
with the reward) =  
Your bid   
Sum of all 2 bids in your group   
                
If you start with no reward, then the more you bid, the more likely you are to transfer the reward to 
yourself. The more the other participant in your group bids, the less likely you are to transfer the reward 
to yourself. Specifically, your chance of transferring the reward to yourself is given by your bid divided 
by the sum of all 2 bids in your group: 
 
You can consider the amounts of the bids to be equivalent to numbers of lottery tickets. The computer 
will draw one ticket from those entered by you and the other participant and either let the reward to stay 
with the participant who starts with it, or transfer it to the other participant through a random draw.  
If you started with the reward and get to keep your reward, your earnings for the period are equal to 
your endowment of 180 tokens plus the reward of 180 tokens minus the cost of your bid. If you do not 
get to keep your reward, your earnings for the period are equal to your endowment of 180 tokens minus 
the cost of your bid. In other words, your earnings are: 
                      
If you keep the reward: Earnings = (Endowment + Reward) – Cost of your bid – 0                                 
= (180 + 180) – your bid – 0  
             
If you do not keep the reward: Earnings = (Endowment + Reward) – Cost of your bid – Reward           
= (180 + 180) – your bid – 180 = 180 – your bid 
                      
 
 
                
Chance of transferring the reward to yourself (if 
you do not start with the reward) =  
Your bid   
Sum of all 2 bids in your group   
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If you started with no reward but the reward is transferred to you, your earnings for the period are equal 
to your endowment of 180 tokens plus the reward of 180 tokens minus the cost of your bid. If the reward 
is not transferred to you, your earnings for the period are equal to your endowment of 180 tokens minus 
the cost of your bid. In other words, your earnings are: 
                      
If the reward is transferred to you: Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Cost of your bid  
= 180 + 180 – your bid 
             
If the reward is not transferred to you: Earnings = Endowment – Cost of your bid  
= 180 – your bid 
                      
 
An Example (for illustrative purposes only) 
Let’s say participant 1 starts with the reward of 180 tokens and participant 2 starts with no reward. Then 
participant 1 bids 30 tokens and participant 2 bids 45 tokens. Therefore, the computer assigns 30 lottery 
tickets to participant 1 and 45 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly draws one 
lottery ticket out of 75 (30 + 45). As you can see, participant 2 has the highest chance that their ticket 
is drawn: 0.60 = 45/75 and participant 1 has 0.40 = 30/75 chance that their ticket is drawn. 
Assume that the computer draws a ticket of participant 1, then the reward stays with participant 1 and 
the earnings of participant 1 for the period are 330 = (180 + 180) – 30 - 0, since the reward is 180 tokens 
and the cost of the bid is 30. Since the reward is not transferred to participant 2, the earnings of 
participant 2 are 135 = 180 – 45.  
If the computer draws a ticket of participant 2, then the reward is transferred to participant 2 and the 
earnings of participant 1 for the period are 150 = (180 + 180) – 30 – 180, since the reward is now 
transferred to participant 2 and the cost of the bid is 30. Similarly, due to the transfer, the earnings of 
participant 2 are 315 = 180 – 45 + 180. 
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all 2 bids in your group, your reward, and your earnings 
for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed 
you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet (page 5) under the 
appropriate heading. 
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IMPORTANT NOTES 
At the beginning of this part of the experiment you will be randomly grouped with another participant 
to form a 2-person group. You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to 
which group.  
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly choose 5 of the 25 periods for actual 
payment for this part of experiment. You will be paid the average of your earnings in these 5 periods. 
These earnings in tokens will be converted to cash at the exchange rate of _1_ token to _3_ Pence 
(£0.03) and will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions? 
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Personal Record Sheet 
(5 periods from here will be randomly chosen for final payments) 
Period Your bid 
Sum of all 2 
bids in your 
group 
Your reward 
Your earnings 
for this period 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
16         
17         
18         
19         
20         
21         
22         
23         
24         
25         
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Total Earnings 
Period Chosen Earnings for this period 
  
  
  
  
  
Total  
 
 
Total earnings from table above:       (1) 
  Average of above earnings: (1) ÷ 5       (2) 
Earnings from Part 1:       (3) 
Total earnings    (2) + (3)      (4) 
Multiply by exchange rate:                 (4)  ×  0.03       
 
Total payment for the experiment:  £     
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QUIZ 
1. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment?   
Ans.       Yes            No   
  
2. Does role of the player, who starts with a reward of 180 tokens or who starts with no rewards, change 
across periods in the experiment?   
Ans.       Yes            No    
 
3. What is the value of 1 token in Pence?   
Ans.       3 Pence               6 Pence            9 Pence   
 
Questions 4 to 7 apply to the following information. 
In a given period, suppose the roes and the bids by participants in your group are as follows. 
Participant 1 starts with a reward of 180 tokens, and participant 2 starts with no reward. 
Bid of participant 1: 55 tokens 
Bid of participant 2: 70 tokens 
 
4.  What is the chance that participant 1 will get to keep the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________  
 
5.  What is the chance that the reward will be transferred to participant 2?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________  
 
6. If you are Participant 1 and you did not get to keep the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. ___________ tokens 
 
7. If you are Participant 2 and the reward is transferred to you, what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. ___________ tokens 
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EXPLANATIONS FOR QUIZ ANSWERS  
 
1. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment?  
Ans.       No 
2. Does role of the player, who starts with a reward of 180 tokens or who starts with no rewards, change 
across periods in the experiment?   
Ans.       Yes            No    
 
3. What is the value of 1 token in Pence?   
Ans.       3 Pence   
4.  What is the chance that participant 1 will get to keep the reward?    
Ans.       55 out of 125. 
 
5.  What is the chance that the reward will be transferred to participant 2?    
Ans.       70 out of 125. 
 
6. If you are Participant 1 and you did not get to keep the reward what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. 125 tokens   (= Endowment + Reward – bid – Reward = 180 + 180 – 55 – 180) 
 
7. If you are Participant 2 and the reward is transferred to you, what are your earnings this period?  
Ans. 290 tokens   (= Endowment + Reward – Bid = 180 + 180 – 70) 
 
 
 
